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This collection of essays is conceived as a Festschrift honouring Emile Adriaan 
B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal on the occasion of his retirement from 
institutional academic life. Its contributors have been drawn from the various 
spheres in which he has operated as a scholar in the course of his career. Our 
aim is to contribute to the various fields of study in which this scholar has been 
active:  
 
•  the study of conflict and its resolution by largely judicial means, in 
rural, kinship-dominated rural settings in Africa;1  
• the study of African land tenure in the context of the post-colonial state;2 
• the study of chieftaincy, in its local and regional dynamics but 
particularly in the national context of the post-colonial state, its 
strategies of legitimation and its policies of decentralisation;3 
• the study of legal pluralism and the sociology of law;4 and finally 
                                                 
1 Cf. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1976b, 1976c, 1989b, 1989c, 1991a; van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal & 
Baerends 1976a, 1977b, 1981b, 1984. A full bibliography of the work of van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 
is presented at the end of this book.  
2 Cf. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1975d, 1977a, 1979a, 1994; van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal & Améga 
1979. 
3 Cf. Brempong, Ray, & van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1995; Ray & van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 
1996a; van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1976b, 1976c, 1980a, 1985c, 1987b, 1989a, 1992a, 1992b, 1993a, 
1993b, 1993b, 2000a, 2002b; van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, Baerends & Griffiths 1987; van Rouveroy 
van Nieuwaal & Reijne 1999a; van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal & van Dijk 1999; van Rouveroy van 
Nieuwaal & Zips 1998. 
4 Cf. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1975a, 1979d, 1980b, 1985b, 1995, 1998a. 
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• ethnocinematography.5  
 
Editorial policy has been to keep the personal and anecdotal element in the 
contributions to an absolute minimum, so that this collection can stand on its 
own as a scholarly text rather than forming a birthday present. However, the 
uniting element in the contributions is the reference to van Rouveroy van 
Nieuwaal’s work. In many ways his career and his scholarly output reflect 
significant developments, and contradictions, in African Studies and in legal 
anthropology in the second half of the twentieth century, both in the 
Netherlands and internationally. It is therefore fitting to have a look at the 
scholar and his work, before we proceed to discuss the contributions in this 
book and their specific contributions to the study of the dynamics of power and 
the rule of law.  
 
 
Emile Adriaan B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal: The 
itinerary of a legal anthropologist  
Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal was born at the beginning of World War II, and 
the war cast a deep shadow over his aristocratic family. His grandfather had 
held a prominent position at the Dutch royal court, and an element of noble 
distinction (with such virtues as hospitality, generosity, insistence on quality, a 
strong identification with the law, and an even stronger sense of independence) 
has been characteristic of van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal throughout his life. This 
also brought him closer to the African chiefs and kings on whom his research 
was to concentrate especially in the second half of his career. Perhaps it was 
the same family tradition which inspired him to earn a military decoration for 
valour during the final days of the Dutch presence in western New Guinea. 
Another distinctive characteristic he must have picked up and developed during 
fieldwork in Africa: his love of land and animals, and his insistence on 
combining an academic career with a part-time livelihood as a small farmer in 
                                                 
5 Cf. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s ethnographic films as listed at the end of this book, and: Séminaire 
sur le documentaire socio-scientifique en Afrique francophone, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, organised 
by van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal in 1980. This conference, however, never led to a publication. I regret 
that van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s cinematographic side had to remain largely undiscussed in this 
book. This was for three interconnected reasons: lack of scholarly texts in which the cinematographer 
himself would bring his cinematographic product within the orbit of text-based scholarship (with van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1985a as the only exception – most films were accompanied by booklets 
setting out the film’s spoken text and general background, but without discussion of method, selection, 
representativeness, manipulation of facts and their relative weight, the implications of the use of 
deliberately posed and staged scenes, etc.); lack therefore of an obvious format in which to bring these 
films into the present book’s discussion; and finally, lack of time and competence to so do even from a 
non-cinematographer’s perspective.  
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the eastern, rural part of the Netherlands, a train journey of several hours away 
from Leiden. Yet Leiden University was to become his alma mater. It is also 
the seat of the Netherlands’ national African Studies Centre, where van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal was to be employed as a researcher, immediately after 
taking his master’s degree in law.  
 Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal joined the African Studies Centre as the one 
and only Ph.D. student ever of Hans Holleman,6 an internationally renowned 
professor of customary law in Leiden University. Holleman was also the 
Centre’s director for almost ten years after its upgrading, in 1958, from a 
documentation centre to an academic research centre. In the 1960s, Africa, 
African Studies, and Dutch society, were all going through a phase in which 
time-honoured authority and ascriptive privilege were severely questioned. 
Participatory power and self-determination were the slogans of the day. Holle-
man had been a benevolent but strict senior civil servant and magistrate in 
minority-ruled Southern Africa, and (although succeeding his brilliant and 
domineering father in the Leiden chair as a typical Leiden professor’s son)7 he 
had come to identify primarily with the English and Afrikaans intellectual 
circles of the Southern African sub-continent. Increasingly a stranger at the 
Leiden scene, he was succeeded as director (subsequently designated ‘general 
secretary’) of the African Studies Centre by Gerrit Grootenhuis in 1967. The 
latter was a professional administrator who had served as a civil servant, not in 
Africa but in New Guinea; he derived from this background an effective 
network, all over Dutch academia and the senior civil service, from which the 
African Studies Centre greatly benefited over a long period until his early 
retirement in 1990.8 Effectively, Holleman’s chair of customary law was 
discontinued upon its incumbent’s retirement, although the Leiden University 
Fund instituted a parallel special chair of ‘Constitutional law in Africa’ which, 
as it worked out, could very well serve as a replacement despite the unmistak-
able difference in designation.  
 In many respects van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s work was a continuation of 
themes in Holleman’s work: interaction between chiefs and the state, the details 
of customary judicial procedure, the analysis of trouble cases, etc.9 But there 
were also marked differences. Selection of Togo, West Africa, as a research 
site for his first research (and as van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s main African 
pied-à-terre in decades to come) implied a totally different set of French 
colonial and constitutional practices, and of academic traditions, as compared 
                                                 
6 Cf. Holleman 1952, 1964, 1981. 
7 Cf. Holleman 1927.  
8 Cf. van Binsbergen 1981a.  
9 Cf. Holleman 1964-1965, 1969, 1973. 
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to those of English and Afrikaans speaking Southern Africa. The language 
barrier between English and French, then even deeper than today, already 
ensured that the academic networks of Holleman and van Rouveroy van 
Nieuwaal would scarcely overlap. The choice for West Africa also meant that, 
by contrast to the legally fairly indifferent Christianity that had been imported 
into Southern Africa10 in recent centuries, Islam11 was to enter van Rouveroy 
van Nieuwaal’s work as the main world religion in the background of northern 
Togo, deploying a well developed legal tradition whose effect on customary 
law at the local level could not be ignored. Other major points of difference 
between Holleman and van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal must be mentioned. The 
latter came to the field as a full-time legal anthropological researcher, not as an 
administrator or magistrate – he was primarily a observer, not a partisan 
participant, and he could therefore study the judicial process on the basis of a 
different engagement with the local social process from Holleman’s. And van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal proved a very perceptive and engaging participant. 
Not all of his great love and insider understanding of local village life could be 
accommodated in his academic writings, and he was almost forced to look for 
an additional mode of expressing his intercultural encounter with West Africa. 
This he found in ethnocinematography, where much of the beauty and the 
meaning of West African life could be conveyed in a direct, compelling and 
often moving way. In the course of the 1970s van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal was 
to develop his skills as an ethnocinematographer to international professional 
standards, which is a rare achievement for any Dutch anthropologist. The final 
point of difference is that throughout the first half of his academic career, van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal formed a stimulating and productive conjugal and 
intellectual team with his first wife, Els Baerends. Most of van Rouveroy van 
Nieuwaal’s publications of that period were co-authored with her. A few lucky 
others (e.g. the von Benda-Beckmanns, both of them contributors to the present 
book; and the Comaroffs) have succeeded in keeping up such a vulnerable 
multifarious union despite the pressures from academia towards individual 
appointments and individual career mobility. Not so the van Rouveroy van 
Nieuwaal–Baerendse team, which broke up at some point in the 1980s.  
 By the middle of the 1970s van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal found himself in a 
great predicament. Having written a better legal-anthropological PhD thesis 
                                                 
10 This is not to deny that, for several centuries, Islam was a major religious expression among the 
Cape Malayans, the descendants of forced immigrants into South Africa hailing from the Indian Ocean 
or the Indonesia. Also, Islam has been a minority expression among Africans in Malawi and Zimbabwe 
for centuries, as it was throughout the twentieth century among Indian migrants. However, the 
expansion of Islam to become a truly major world religion in Southern Africa only dates from the last 
few decades of the twentieth century CE.  
11 Cf. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal & Baerends 1975, 1986. 
Introduction: Chiefs and the state, agency, customary law, and violence 
13 
than any Dutch Africanist of his generation,12 and brimming with ambition, he 
had ended up as the intellectual crown prince to a king without a kingdom 
(Holleman), and moreover as prince had exiled himself geographically and 
linguistically to far outside the whimsical and authoritarian king’s former 
realm. At the time, largely as an inheritance from the Holleman period, legal 
research was an important focus at the African Studies Centre, with (in addition 
to van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal) such researchers as Barbara Bond and Jules 
Rijnsdorp, seconded by the methodologist Rudo Niemeijer and the linguist 
Vernon February, all just returned from a comprehensive research project in 
Sierra Leone. By the end of the 1970s the jurist Gerti Hesseling (now director 
of the African Studies Centre) would join their ranks, still pursuing her PhD 
work under Leo Prakke, with Wim van Binsbergen as external examiner. Van 
Leynseele and Baesjou touched on related themes elsewhere in Africa. Under 
van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s leadership a Law Section was beginning to 
articulate itself within the loosely structured, loosely supervised African 
Studies Centre research, when in 1980 the Centre came under heavy public 
attack from the then professor of African anthropology in Leiden University, 
Adam Kuper.  
 South African born and subsequently naturalised British Kuper was the 
nephew of the anthropologists Leo and Hilda Kuper, keen to emulate if not to 
surpass their international fame, and to carry on the torch of South Africans’ 
leadership in social anthropology which dated back to the days of Radcliffe-
Brown. If he had been a Dutchman or had internalised Dutch assumptions 
about the exercise of institutional power, his attack on close academic 
colleagues in front of the representatives of their government funding agencies 
had been inconceivable. But more was at stake than mere cultural insensitivity 
– although this is a remarkable trait in an anthropologist. A foreigner like most 
of his predecessors in the chair (the Ghanaian Busia and the Briton Beattie), 
Kuper was after all a Leiden professor, and his attack revealed a structural 
contradiction between Leiden University and the African Studies Centre, going 
back to the late 1950s. While being a national research institution on whose 
board all universities of the Netherlands were represented, the Centre rented 
accommodation within the premises of Leiden University, and Leiden senior 
staff enjoyed considerable privileges in the Centre’s administration; e.g. the 
chairperson of the Centre’s board was stipulated to be a Leiden professor. 
When Adam Kuper acceded to the Leiden chair of African anthropology 
(1976), he found the development sociologist van Lier and later the linguist 
                                                 
12 By the logic of an asymmetrical division of reproductive and productive labour too often attending 
two-career marriages, nearly two decades separated van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s PhD thesis and that 
of Els Baerends, based on their joint fieldwork (Baerends 1994). By the time the latter thesis was 
completed, their intellectual collaboration had been over for a decade.  
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Voorhoeve in the chair of the Centre’s board. In vain, Kuper made attempts to 
mobilise the considerable resources of the African Studies Centre so as to add 
to the minimum personnel and financial resources attaching to his own chair. 
His denouncement of the Centre partly reflects his frustration. Admittedly, 
however, Kuper was also speaking out of genuine concern about the archaic 
state of research at the Centre at the time: the absence of long-term research 
planning and of intellectual leadership, the low productivity of some of the 
tenured researchers, and the paucity of conspicuous international publications.  
 The Centre responded quickly by enacting a totally new structure, with two 
tightly organised research departments encompassing the great majority of 
ongoing research on the basis of elaborate and integrated long-term research 
planning. Thus emerged the Department of Socio-Economic Studies, headed by 
the psychologist Jan Hoorweg (who had established a very promising 
interdisciplinary food and nutrition research project in Kenya); and the 
Department of Political and Historical Studies, headed by the anthropologist 
Wim van Binsbergen, who (having joined the Centre after acting in the Leiden 
chair of African anthropology) had just served as Simon Professor of Social 
Anthropology in the University of Manchester, United Kingdom. These two 
research directors, with the Centre’s Librarian Koos van der Meulen, and under 
the continued managing directorship of Gerrit Grootenhuis, were to constitute 
the executive management of the Centre for the next decade. Kuper had done 
the Centre a great service in disguise: when within a few years it became 
imperative for Dutch research institutes and universities to have integrated, 
long-term research programmes as a precondition for government funding, the 
Centre was found to be exemplary in this respect.  
 What then followed was a social drama of the type studied by legal 
anthropologists with the technique of ‘extended case analysis’,13 and best 
exemplified by Victor Turner’s famous description of the vicissitudes 
surrounding the controversial Zambian villager Sandombu in Schism and 
continuity in an African society.14 Perhaps the demonised insider-outsider is a 
                                                 
13 Van Velsen 1967.  
14 Turner 1957. Insiders of the Manchester School (1948-1975) claim that, under Gluckman’s 
stimulating but highly demanding and occasionally oppressive leadership, the Sandombu role was also 
played by one of the senior members of this circle. Turner himself is a likely candidate for the role: he 
was the only one to leave his Manchester phase radically behind him and pursue a totally different 
approach concentrating on symbolism and ritual, which brought him world fame. But there are other 
candidates, such as Avner Cohen, Ronald Frankenburg, and F.G. Bailey. In many respects, Emrys 
Peters was the odd man out in Manchester anthropology in the 1960s-1980s, but although his insistence 
on the ideological and constructed nature of Arab representations of agnatic kin groups fitted in well 
with the transactionalist environment of Manchester, with his 1951 Oxford PhD (Peters 1951) he was 
not a student or client of Gluckman’s. Of course, any correspondence between Leiden and Manchester 
is merely accidental and does not suggest that the protagonists in the scholarly dramas on either side of 
the Channel were of comparable stature.  
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necessary ingredient of any human group or community. Frazer, Freud, Girard, 
and in their steps Simonse, have explored the possibility that in such insider-
outsidership lies the formation of kingship, even of human society in general.15 
While the social and political parameters differ, the underlying pattern of the 
drama is similar. If Africanists unblinkingly analyse the games of power, 
succession, secession, and individual independence at the African village level, 
without implying that the protagonists involved in these dramas are anything 
less or more than just human, I see no reason to be squeamish about the details 
of an episode that provides the key to van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s career. 
However successful ultimately, in its progress that career would remain 
puzzling without knowledge of these details. They illustrate instructively the 
social anthropology of competition and reconciliation at the academic village 
level, show the protagonists in a revealing but not necessarily negative light, 
and add a dimension of reflexivity to our scholarly work which makes it more 
readily recognisable (and credible) as a relentless and impassive pursuit of 
truth.  
 By 1981 it was clear that the African Studies Centre’s new organisational 
structure left no room for a separate, relatively small, Law Section. In hindsight 
I admit, as one of the protagonists in the evolving drama, that the new and 
inexperienced academic directors of the Centre were too immersed in the task 
of building their respective departments and in coaxing the (still somewhat 
anarchistic) members into a measure of compliance – in other words, were too 
much preoccupied with the survival of the Centre as a whole, than that they 
could challenge Grootenhuis’ determination to push van Rouveroy van 
Nieuwaal to the Centre’s periphery. For years a struggle (at times vicious) was 
waged about the Law Section’s place in the organisation.  
 Trends in the background suggested already a particular outcome for this 
struggle. For in the wake of Africa’s decolonisation in the 1960s, of the 
performance of the post-colonial states ever since (in terms of decline, one-
partyism, corruption, military coups), of the continent’s economic decline and 
of the concomitant increase in intercontinental development co-operation, the 
study of Africa was undergoing a shift from the legal field to political science, 
geography, and economics. Although anthropologists would continue to 
dominate African Studies for another decade, also in their field the general shift 
just indicated could be noticed. Paradigmatically this development was 
furthered by a shift from structural functionalism to transactionalism (e.g. of 
the Manchester School variety, of which I will say more below), and to 
Marxism. The times were over when the debates between legal anthropologists 
could captivate the whole of the Africanist profession (as had been the case in 
                                                 
15 Frazer 1957; Freud 1913; Girard 1972; Simonse 1992. 
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the context of the Gluckman-Bohannan debate16 on the admissibility of 
established North Atlantic analytical concepts in the study of African law – an 
early version of the later, more general debate on emic and etic).17 In 1974 the 
African Studies Centre had still been the scene of a massive ‘International 
Seminar on New Directions in African Family Law’,18 but such an event was 
unlikely to be repeated in the near future. Gluckman had still gone out of his 
way to argue the relevance of African legal anthropology in terms 
understandable to USA students of current, North Atlantic positive law.19 Soon 
however, John L. Comaroff and Simon Roberts20 would clamour that Africanist 
legal anthropologists should move away from the study of rules (which was 
still much indebted to, and congenial to, the positive legal studies as pursued at 
North Atlantic law faculties), and towards a much more comprehensive 
attention for socio-legal processes, for the most part extra-judicial, involving 
the community and beyond. In the same time, the leading anthropologist Geertz 
was to raise ‘serious concerns about the ability of anthropologists and legal 
                                                 
16 Gluckman 1969c; Bohannan 1969. 
17 Headland et al. 1990; Pike 1954. In a nutshell,  
‘emic and etic express the distinction between an internal structuring of a cultural orientation 
such as is found in the consciousness of its bearers, on the one hand, and, on the other, a 
structuring that is imposed from the outside. Etic has nothing to do with ethics in the sense of 
the philosophy of the judgement of human action in terms of good and evil. Pike’s 
terminology is based on a linguistic analogy. In linguistics one approaches the description of 
speech sounds from two complementary perspectives: that of phonetics (hence -etic), which 
furnishes a purely external description, informed by anatomical and physical parameters, 
revolving on the air vibrations of which the speech sounds consist; and the perspective of 
phonology, whose basic unit of study is the phoneme (adjective: ‘phonemic’, hence -emics): 
the smallest unit of speech sound that is effectively distinguished by language users 
competent in a particular language, basing themselves on the distinctive features of that 
speech sound. (...) Pike thus codified the two-stage analytical stance (both etic and emic) of 
the classic anthropology that had emerged in the second quarter of the twentieth century with 
such proponents as Malinowski, Evans-Pritchard, Fortes, Griaule and Leiris.’ (van 
Binsbergen, in press).  
18 Cf. Roberts 1977. At the time, Simon Roberts was a legal anthropologist of good standing (cf. 
Roberts 1970, 1971, 1972a, 1972b), but he was only distantly connected with the African Studies 
Centre, and his editorship was only decided upon at the end of the conference, whereas he had not 
organised it. Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal was still writing his PhD thesis and was apparently 
considered not yet eligible as editor of an authoritative international collection.  
19 Gluckman 1965, 1969b. 
20 Comaroff & Roberts 1981. At the time, my friend John L. Comaroff was considered one of the most 
promising exponents of what was left of the Manchester School after Gluckman’s death (1975). Later 
work led him and his wife Jean Comaroff to Foucault-inspired, visionary analyses of nineteenth-
century Tswana society (Comaroff & Comaroff 1991, 1997). However, the extent to which he 
continued to identify with legal anthropology is manifest from the memorable words he spoke – with 
the modesty he and I have always had in common – during a Leiden seminar in November 2002, when 
a question on legal anthropology was raised from the audience: ‘I am legal anthropology’. (‘L’État, 
c’est moi’, is a famous adage attributed to King Louis XIV of seventeenth-century CE France.) 
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thinkers to combine their approaches as part of an interdisciplinary project’.21 
The future looked bleak for Africanist legal anthropology as pursued by 
someone who by his pre-PhD training was primarily a positive jurist.  
 Also, on the personal level, in an environment then largely functioning on 
the basis of academic patronage and old-boys ties, van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 
could not count on any patronage extended to him by his former academic 
supervisor, who was persona non grata with the African Studies Centre’s 
managing director to boot. Moreover, van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal had 
concentrated on a national audience for the marketing of his earliest academic 
products, and on ethnographic films (however sensitive and innovative). 
Working (however diligently) from his distant small farm he skipped no 
opportunity to advertise his double role as intellectual cum farmer. All this 
scarcely added to his strategic resources in academia.  
 By the time when the other members of the Law Section had either left or 
been incorporated into the two main departments, van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 
found himself utterly isolated, with the national network of legal 
anthropologists (the ‘Folk Law Circle’, established in 1976) as his only 
remaining strategic resource and source of intellectual inspiration. John 
Griffiths, Franz von Benda-Beckman, and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann née 
Drooglever-Fortuyn were among van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s prominent 
fellow-members of this circle. Strongly represented on the nation-wide 
committee that was to appoint the new, part-time, unremunerated special 
professor in African constitutional law in Leiden University, the members of 
the ‘Folk Law Circle’ understandably showed their loyalty.22 In 1984 van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal was appointed in this position.23 It was a move that 
further isolated him from the Centre where he continued to enjoy full-time paid 
employment, – another example of the structural contradictions between 
Leiden University and the African Studies Centre. The great significance of 
this professorial appointment as a personal confirmation of authority and 
prestige will be obvious to most African and European readers, but it may need 
special mention to USA readers, used as the latter are to a situation where 
pecuniary remuneration is the main gauge of success, and where the great 
majority of academic staff boast the title of professor, instead of only a few per 
                                                 
21 Cf. Geertz 1983; Nixon n.d. 
22 Another display of loyalty was the allegation, by another prominent member of the ‘Folk Law 
Circle’ namely John Griffiths, to the effect that the study of law at the African Studies Centre, Leiden, 
had been destroyed by the recent reorganisation. Cf. Griffiths 1983, 1984; van Binsbergen 1984.  
23 van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1985c. 
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cent (like in the Netherlands). In some ways, a Dutch professorship is 
comparable to an African kingship or chieftainship.24 
 In the process, van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal largely abandoned the research 
on land tenure and the post-colonial state in Africa, which had earlier been 
formulated as the intended backbone of a Law Section under his direction. 
Instead, in extensive preparation for his Leiden 1985 inaugural lecture, he 
concentrated on the study of African chieftaincy in the colonial and post-
colonial context, thus amplifying a line of research which has already been part 
of his PhD work and a major interest of Holleman’s. With this new research 
endeavour, with his new, albeit part-time, responsibilities for lectures and PhD 
supervision, with difficult patches in his personal life, and with the conflictive 
relations surrounding him at the African Studies Centre, a decade was to elapse 
before he made another ethnographic film in Africa.25  
 Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s research on chiefs was an increasing 
success, and in time justified the credit which had been extended to him 
through his professorial appointment. Given the re-orientation of Africanist 
research sketched above, the topic initially struck the majority of his colleagues 
as anachronistic and irrelevant. Apparently there were so many more topical 
issues to be pursued by a specialist in customary law. Inevitably, also, many 
Africanists shared the positivist expectations of most Independence legislators 
to the effect that for the chiefs’ ascriptive privileges there could be little or no 
room within a new Africa constitutionally modelled after British and French 
examples. The decline of African post-colonial state systems, and the resilience 
of African chiefs, proved these expectations wrong. Meanwhile, over the years, 
by means of an incessant stream of articles, special issues of journals, and 
ultimately also international conferences,26 books, and films, van Rouveroy van 
Nieuwaal managed to establish himself, nationally and internationally, as ‘Mr 
Chiefs’. The continued interest of high ranking international specialists, both in 
Africa and in the North Atlantic, was ensured, also by the diversification of the 
                                                 
24 While the two terms have vastly overlapping semantic fields and therefore are difficult to separate, 
in this book ‘chieftaincy’ is in principle used to designate the general African, and comparative 
historical, institution for the exercise of traditional authority, whereas ‘chieftainship’ is in principle 
reserved for a particular instance, in time and space, of the institution of chieftaincy. Thus we will 
speak of ‘chieftaincy in post-colonial Africa’, but of ‘the late-twentieth century revival of the 
chieftainship of Mwene Shakalongo in western central Zambia’ (see below).  
25 Cf. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1981b, 1983a, 1992c; van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal & Baerends 
1981a. 
26 Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal (co-)organised the following conferences on the theme of chieftaincy 
in Africa: Conference on the contribution of traditional authority to development, human rights and 
environmental protection: Strategies for Africa, Accra, Ghana (1994 ); Chieftaincy in Africa, Leiden: 
African Studies Centre and Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1996); and: Chefferie 
traditionnelle et l’État post-colonial en Afrique de l’ouest, Niamey, Niger (2002). 
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topic into such related fields as the role of the post-colonial state, decentralisa-
tion, and legal pluralism. In the process, van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal came to 
rely increasingly on English, although his latest authored book27 is in French 
again.  
 Success was achieved despite the fact that the productive relationship with 
Els Baerends had shipwrecked, and that van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, in 
principle, had to work single-handedly. No personnel or financial benefits 
attached to his Leiden chair; the personal salary and research funds from the 
African Studies Centre continued to form van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s main 
resource. Increasingly defining African fieldwork as the making of films, and 
having early on adopted professional standards as far as shooting, sound 
recording and cutting were concerned, van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s fieldwork 
became more and more expensive. Even under the warmest intra-staff 
relationships an institution like the African Studies Centre could not have 
afforded to furnish the full subsidy needed for an ethnographic film of half an 
hour or longer. However, already in the 1970s van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal had 
learned to find his way in the tricky marshlands of external funding agencies. 
Also, his proven talent for joint research and joint publishing (a quality rarely 
found among anthropologists, but one undeniably conducive to scientific 
productivity, intersubjectivity, objectivity, and the avoidance of personal 
myopia in research) now turned to other partners, both internationally and at 
the African Studies Centre itself, even if this meant involving anthropologists 
without much of a legal specialisation.  
 Once the conflict over the discontinuation of the Law Section had subsided, 
towards the end of the 1980s, van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal came to engage in 
productive collaboration with his colleagues in the Department of Political and 
Historical studies (notably Wim van Binsbergen and Piet Konings), those in the 
department’s successor the Theme Group on Globalisation (e.g. Rijk van Dijk), 
and with the Centre’s visiting fellows from Africa (e.g. Francis Nyamnjoh and 
Nicodemus Awasom). There is much reassuring irony in the fact that van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s most productive years were the last five or six of his 
institutional career, when in the security and inspiration he enjoyed as a 
respected senior member of the Theme Group on Globalisation, he actively 
participated in collegial debate, greatly contributed to the Theme Group’s 
output, and received full institutional backing in the making of two more 
films.28  
 Other productive relations arose from his personal link with Leiden 
University (e.g. Peter Skalník, Barbara Oomen), from his PhD and MA 
                                                 
27 Cf. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 2000b. 
28 Cf. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal & van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 2000, and in preparation. 
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supervision (e.g. Leo de Haan and M. Reijne, and from Africa Cyprian Fisiy 
and Athalia Molokomme, among others), and from interaction with 
international fellow-specialists in the study of chieftaincy: John Griffiths, 
Donald Ray, Chief Nana Brempong (formerly known as Kwame Arhin), and 
Werner Zips. From the ranks of his own family came his son Maarten van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, who as a budding film maker collaborated with his 
father in the latter’s two most recent ethnocinematographic projects.  
 When we add to these names those of international colleagues working on 
chieftaincy and related topics (e.g. Cathérine Baroin, Insa Nolte, Trutz von 
Trotha) then all contributors to the present book have been accounted for.29 
Having sketched what brought them together, in the next section we will look 
at their contributions, under the following headings:  
 
• The interaction between chiefs the state in the colonial and post-colonial 
periods 
• Is the interaction between chiefs and the post-colonial state a zero-sum 
game? 
• Structure or agency?  
• The nature of customary law, and  
• The role of violence. 
 
 
The interaction between chiefs and the state in the colonial 
and post-colonial periods 
Many African chieftainships, and the collectivities (often conceived in terms of 
ethnic groups) ruled by them, are recognised to be colonial creations. However, 
the majority of African chieftainships have roots in a more distant, pre-colonial 
past, under very different political and economic conditions from those 
obtaining under the colonial and post-colonial state. Most authors in this 
collection agree that, as a result, fundamental transformations have taken place 
in African chieftaincy in the course of the twentieth century CE. Several papers 
describe these transformations in detail, and seek to interpret them 
systematically.  
 Thus, INSA NOLTE’s article reflects van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s research 
both in the choice of the topic and in the line of reasoning. It examines the 
encounter between nationalist and traditional politics on a local level in 
                                                 
29 I would have much preferred to include Moussa Djiré in this list, who contributed greatly to van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s latest film project in Mali. However, due to unforeseen technical difficulties 
the distance between Mali and Europe, and between French and English, could not be bridged in time 
given the tight schedule under which this book was prepared.  
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colonial and post-colonial Nigeria. It concentrates on the relationship between 
two groups of power-holders in Ijebu-Remo, a former district in the west of 
Nigeria, and on the agency of Remo-born Obafemi Awolowo, leader of one of 
Nigeria’s three national post-independence parties. Awolowo intervened in the 
traditional politics of the district through the cultural organisation Egbe Omo 
Oduduwa and through party politics. He was also involved in traditional 
politics in his hometown Ikenne, where he manipulated the installation of the 
oba (traditional ruler) against considerable opposition in 1950. 
 Nolte argues that Awolowo’s activities and the Ikenne dispute were part of 
an intense struggle in which both traditional rulers and nationalist politicians 
attempted to gain legitimacy in each other’s political arena. While this process 
reflects the fact that traditional rulers became increasingly embroiled in post-
colonial politics – a point often made in van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s writings 
– it also demonstrates that members of the newer nationalist elite desperately 
attempted to appropriate traditional authority. The complex reasons for this 
process are explored in Nolte’s argument. A striking contradiction becomes 
apparent: in his role as modern politician, Awolowo publicly expressed a 
highly critical view of traditional rulers, but this did not prevent him from 
interference in the dispute over the district throne; he even went as far as 
accepting a chieftaincy title himself. Clearly, Awolowo’s personal status was in 
itself highly involved with traditional authority, both in his home community 
and beyond.  
 Nolte’s analysis yields an important conclusion:  
 
‘...in so far as traditional authority claims legitimacy and authenticity, it remains subject 
to grassroots criticism and demands for the representation of local interests and 
communal aspirations. The very rootedness of traditional authority continues to make it a 
significant aspect of state power in Nigeria, and van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s 
description of traditional rulers as mediators between the locality and the state makes an 
important point.30 On the basis of the findings from this paper, I would even suggest that 
traditional authority actively contributes to the negotiation and configuration of local, 
regional and even wider political identities, thus actively shaping Africa’s political 
landscape below and beyond the level of state politics.’ 
 
 In this way, a refrain is introduced which we will hear at many points in 
this collection:  
 
• In twentieth-century Africa, chiefs sought to obtain authority and 
security in the domain of the modern national state, just as the modern 
national state, and its prominent actors, sought to derive traditional 
authority from chieftaincy.  
                                                 
30 Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1999: 34f (reference in the original). 
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 While Nolte offers the illuminating image of the modern African state as 
the scene of a struggle between old and new elites, PIET KONINGS in his 
contribution shows how between these two elites there is often a convergence 
of interest and action. Konings’ paper is set within the wider issue of 
privatisation as a key instrument in the stabilisation and Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) imposed on Africa by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. While there is now an abundance of literature on 
the role of chieftaincy in African post-colonial states, Konings’ article is the 
first study to examine the role of chieftaincy in current privatisation projects. 
Leading specialists, including van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, have been more 
interested in the role of chieftaincy in political liberalisation than in economic 
liberalisation. Konings focuses on the virulent opposition of Bakweri chiefs in 
Anglophone Cameroon to the government announcement on 15 July 1994 
concerning the privatisation of the Cameroon Development Corporation 
(CDC), one of the oldest and largest agro-industrial parastatals in the country. 
These chiefs claimed Bakweri ownership of CDC lands. They felt betrayed at 
not having previously been consulted about the CDC privatisation, and warned 
the government that the corporation could not be sold to non-natives without 
Bakweri consent and compensation. Konings seeks to demonstrate that the 
current resistance of the Bakweri chiefs to CDC privatisation is part of their 
long-standing struggle for the return of the vast Bakweri lands that were 
expropriated during German colonial rule for the purpose of plantation 
agriculture and later, in 1946, leased by the British Trust Authority to the 
newly created CDC. In this endeavour, the chiefs have always been assisted by 
the Bakweri ‘modern’ elite who, like their chiefs, felt aggrieved by the 
dramatic loss of their ancestral lands. Following the announcement of the 
privatisation of the CDC, the Bakweri chiefs have received support from other 
sectors of the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ elite in Anglophone Cameroon. The 
latter are inclined to perceive the privatisation of the CDC as a renewed 
onslaught by the Francophone-dominated post-colonial state on Anglophone 
identity and colonial heritage. This alliance of the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
elites forms a mighty force to ensure that justice will prevail on the issue of the 
Bakweri lands. It has forced the government to repeatedly postpone the actual 
privatisation of the CDC, and to finally enter into negotiations with the 
landowners. 
 It is interesting to see how a new phase in the large-scale, capitalist 
expropriation of land (notably, the privatisation of plantations) lends the chiefs 
the opportunity to revive, after half a century, the time-honoured notions of 
collective land tenure and of the chief as custodian of the land on behalf of his 
people. But this apparent re-sourcing from a pre-colonial world-view goes not 
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without a profound transformation, for, in the ensuing conflict, the chiefs 
primarily appear under the guise of landowners in a modern capitalist sense!  
 Konings’ argument adds substantially to our understanding of Bakweri 
chiefs in Cameroon:  
 
‘Geschiere has pointed out two reasons for the integration of chieftaincy, which was more 
or less a colonial creation, into Bakweri society: (1) chieftaincy was strengthened during 
British indirect rule and, even more significantly, (2) it became a potential rallying point 
against the ‘strangers’ who invaded the Bakweri territory in large numbers, attracted by 
the plantation economy created by the Germans.31 My study suggests that (3) the 
persistent struggle of the Bakweri chiefs since the 1940s for justice with regard to the 
expropriated Bakweri lands may have been an even more important factor for rooting 
chieftaincy in local society. While chiefs in Anglophone Cameroon have been officially 
transformed into ‘auxiliaries’ of the state in the aftermath of independence and 
reunification and most chiefs maintain close links with the ruling party,32 my case study 
proves that Bakweri chiefs cannot be characterised as mere puppets of the regime.’33  
 
 Three further important themes emerge here that will return in other 
chapters:  
 
• The African chief has his own, considerable power base which is in 
principle independent from the modern national state and cannot be 
reduced to the latter. 
• Transformations during the colonial and post-colonial period have 
given chiefs the opportunity to pose as the true and obvious 
representatives of their people, thus bridging any cleavages of class, 
exploitation and violence which in all likelihood characterised the 
relations between the population and today’s chiefs’ pre-colonial 
predecessors, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries CE.  
• Increasingly, the interaction between African chiefs and the outside 
world, especially the post-colonial state, takes place indirectly, via the 
medium (or interface) of non-governmental formal organisations 
(particularly: ethnic and regional associations,34 political parties, and 
North Atlantic dominated NGOs35), whose formal constitutional 
                                                 
31 Geschiere 1993: 165-166 (reference in the original).  
32 Geschiere 1993: 166-169; Fisiy 1995: 57-59 (reference in the original).  
33 Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996: 39 (reference in the original); italics added, WvB.  
34 This aspect is also stressed in Nyamnjoh’s contribution to the present book. For a detailed recent 
study of the interaction between African chiefs and non-governmental ethnic and religious 
organisation, see also: van Binsbergen 1999, 2003. 
35 Cf. the settlement of the Nanumba/Konkomba conflict in northern Ghana by the intercession of 
international non-governmental organisations, as described in the Peter Skalník’s contribution to the 
present book.  
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structure and logic makes them workable in the modern world, while 
their membership, implied ideology, and informal actual functioning can 
still accommodate time-honoured particularities of ethnic and chiefly 
allegiance.  
 
I shall come back to the last point below, under the heading of agency; there I 
shall offer a theoretical explanation why formal organisations should play this 
particular role. 
 These themes also reverberate in the contribution by NICODEMUS 
AWASOM. He examines the vacillating fortunes of twentieth century Mankon 
fons (kings) in Cameroon vis-à-vis the colonial and post-colonial state. He does 
this from the converging perspectives of power relations, legitimacy and 
legality. The traditional rulers of Mankon derive their legitimacy and authority 
from pre-colonial roots, while the modern nation state is a creation of, and the 
successor of, the imposed colonial state. Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal has 
examined the hybrid role of African chieftaincy and the judicial poverty or void 
to which the institution is exposed. He has perceived the evolution of power 
relations between African chiefs and the modern state as ‘a zero-sum game’, in 
that the expansion of state power mostly seems to take place at the expense of 
that of the chiefs. This view implies the progressive erosion of traditional 
authority, their only condition of survival being their ability to adapt to the 
changing reality, both inwardly towards their own people, and outwardly 
towards the state. Traditional rulers are thus regarded as units that are 
continuously in the process of satisfying both the state and their subjects, and 
that attempt to strike a balance between the two for their own survival.  
 Awasom examines how the twentieth-century fons of Mankon have 
demonstrated extraordinary resilience, by continuously adopting to new forces 
that often threatened to marginalise or obliterate the fons’ existence. In the 
colonial era, the relationship between the fons of Mankon and the state quickly 
evolved from symmetrical to asymmetrical, as a result of the rise of new forces 
that emanated from rapid globalisation, and the deliberate violation of colonial 
statutes in favour of Realpolitik or pragmatic administration.  
 Awasom’s paper has interesting cross-linkages. The author’s namesake 
(Stephen Anye Awasom: presumably his father, uncle or grandfather) features 
as one of the modern educated elite mediated, in the 1950s, between two 
members of the traditional elite. And the Mankon fons also return in another 
contribution to this book, by Francis Nyamnjoh.  
 Awasom particularly reveals the dangers of the African chiefs’ common 
entry into national modern politics:  
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‘Since the introduction of the new multiparty culture in the 1990s, however, the fons’ 
sacred position has been subjected to aggressive demystification. This has been the direct 
result of their open involvement in the new multi-party politics on the side of the 
government party, which was highly contested by the overwhelming majority of the 
people. As the fons have been unable to please both their subjects and the government 
simultaneously, they have thus found themselves caught between Scylla and Charybdis. 
Ultimately, neither the people of Mankon nor the modern state could reliably and fully 
guarantee the traditional integrity of the fons. The fons on the other hand had to depend 
upon both to legitimise their position, but due to the fact that they often tended to favour 
the state, they ultimately became labelled as puppets.’  
 
Another theme emerges from Awasom’s paper:  
 
• While it is an accepted view in the study of African chieftaincy that 
chiefs and the state are engaged in a battle over each other’s legitimacy, 
we should not overlook another struggle for legitimacy: that among the 
chiefs themselves.  
 
 The colonial state made no secret of the fact th36at it was a repressive 
conquest state with adequate military backing. It was less interested in 
legitimating itself in the eyes of the African subjects (as distinct from citizens), 
than in controlling – through a policy of divide and rule – the chiefs as 
potentially dangerous sources of a local, parochial power. Succession disputes 
and disputes over areas of jurisdiction and competence received ample 
attention from the part of the colonial administration and thus found their way 
into the archives. Among twentieth-century African national states, the 
Republic of South Africa has persisted longer than any other in maintaining the 
repressive features just outlined, and it can be no accident that Barbara Oomen 
in her contribution to this book signals the following trend:  
 
‘The existence of two rival chiefs forces both to gain the support of the populace, through 
decisions that the public opinion can perceive as wise, and through policies that the public 
opinion can perceive as acceptable. If support is not found, people can, and will, change 
sides. In these subtle processes, the [South African] state, for all its heterogeneity, 
generally supports the candidate whose reign is disputed by his subjects.37  
 
 
Is the interaction between chiefs and the post-colonial state a 
zero-sum game? 
Like Nolte, Awasom makes reference to a cherished idea of van Rouveroy van 
Nieuwaal: the conception of the interaction between chiefs and the post-
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colonial state as a zero-sum game, which apparently leaves the chiefs no option 
but to adapt virtually unconditionally to the state. Awasom confirms the zero-
sum-game interpretation but his own findings meanwhile suggests a rather 
more complex picture:  
 
‘The fons survived, not through direct confrontation with the colonial state, but by 
persistently asserting their claims to traditional legitimacy. They did so by seeking legal 
redress through petitions and by falling back on their subjects for defence, while avoiding 
any direct confrontation with the state. In the post-colonial era, the fons of Mankon 
successfully blended modernity and traditionalism by compromising with the 
constitutional and legislative instruments of the modern state while still adorning 
themselves with the traditional support structures of their power.’ 
 
 This is clearly not the description of a zero-sum game, because it implies 
not one stake (e.g. ‘the overall amount of legitimated power within society’), 
but at least two different stakes (on the one hand constitutional legal authority, 
on the other hand traditional authority), in a game whose outcome and rules are 
not entirely defined by the state but are subject to change, negotiation and 
initiative from both sides as the game evolves.  
 The point is of considerable importance, for the assumption of a straight-
forward, simple zero-sum game immediately implies that we are at a loss to 
understand the remarkable survival and resilience of chiefs in twentieth-century 
Africa, and after. For surely, if it were so simple, why does the state not once 
for all annihilate the chiefs and impose, one-sidedly, and on the basis of its 
rationalistic logic, its own compelling conditions on the national political and 
ideological process?  
 Figure 1 is a schematic rendering of a zero-sum game. Two parties A and B 
are in competition over a limited resource, C. Out of the entire range of 
possible outcomes, the figure singles out three: (1) A wins nearly all of C, at 
B’s expense; (2) A and B take equal shares of C; (3) B wins nearly all of C, at 
A’s expense.  
 
Figure 1. Minimum representation of a zero-sum game. 
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Applied to the specific case of twentieth-century African chieftaincy, Figure 1 
can be said to present a simple zero-sum game model for the interaction 
between  
 
• A: the post-colonial state and  
• B: the chiefs, over  
• C: the overall amount of legitimated power within society.  
 
Three outcomes are envisaged:  
 
1. Virtually all legitimated power within society goes to the post-colonial 
state;  
2. post-colonial state and chiefs have each an equal share of legitimated power 
within society;  
3. virtually all legitimated power within society goes to the chiefs. 
 
Underlying such a zero-sum model is a highly mechanical, aggregate concept-
ion of the process of legitimate power in any society, without taking into 
account the complex and contradictory nature of ideological and legitimation 
processes. Why should the state seek legitimation? Mainly,  
 
• in order to constrain open conflict within its territory to manageable 
proportions, and  
• in order to secure for its senior personnel (on the basis of their being 
perceived as empowered by ‘the will of the people’) recognition by and 
access to international bodies which judge a state’s acceptability by 
criteria of constitutional performance, observance of human rights, 
democratic exercise of power, rightful exercise of justice, etc.  
 
 Without such legitimation, no rule of law can be claimed to exist. Such 
legitimation, in terms of what Weber38 defined as legal authority, is of a very 
different nature from that which the chiefs claim as basis of their own position. 
The chiefs’ exercise of power and justice amounts to traditional authority, in 
other words it is legitimated because their position (provided the proper 
procedures of selection, enthronement, and subsequent protocol were observed) 
is seen as the embodiment of the fundamental structure of society and of the 
world. The chief is considered to be at the hub of a cosmology that regulates 
the dispensation and circulation of power among humans and in the world at 
large. This cosmology sets the conditions for order, fertility, morality and 
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purity, and in its turn depends on these conditions for a proper functioning. 
Under twentieth-century conditions of state incorporation, most African chiefs 
have come to depend on state recognition for their functioning at the regional 
and national level. However, their legitimation derives from the local level in 
the first place, to such an extent, that chiefs may defy state recognition and still 
be chiefs.  
 
Related examples from western central Zambia39 may demonstrate this point. The lands 
of western central Zambia were incorporated in the Lozi (Barotse) state, during and after 
the Kololo intermezzo (1840-1864) and right into the first decades of the twentieth 
century, when Barotseland was a Protectorate within the then Northwestern Rhodesia. In 
the process, some local rulers (belonging to a dynastic cluster that was increasingly 
associated with the emerging ethnic name of ‘Nkoya’) came to be considered as senior 
members of the Lozi aristocracy; as a result they shared in the state subsidy stipulated by 
the Barotse Treaty of 1900. Other local rulers however saw their titles abolished. Their 
legitimacy was thus denied by both the Lozi indigenous state and by the colonial state. 
The most prominent of these titles was Mwene (‘king’, ‘chief’) Shakalongo of the 
Luampa valley. However, ideologically and ritually these apparently abolished 
chieftainships lived on, albeit that they were temporarily invested in what for the outside 
world were mere village headmen. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the Nkoya 
went through an intensified ethnic revival. Partly through the action of the Kazanga 
Cultural Association (a creation of the Nkoya urban elite), the Shakalongo title was 
formally reinstated, after almost a century. The same Nkoya militant action brought the 
recognised chiefs Mwene Kahare and Mwene Mutondo, and their increasingly vocal 
educated and urban followers, in direct confrontation with the Lozi chieftainship of 
Naliele. The latter chieftainship had been provocatively created by the Lozi Paramount 
Chief smack in the middle of Nkoyaland in the 1930s; in the 1950s-1960s its incumbent 
was Chief Mwendaweli, who prior to his accession had been Gluckman’s principal 
research assistant around 1940. The 1980s-1990s saw much violent action, the sudden 
death of the chief of Naliele under suspicious circumstances, mass detention of Nkoya 
militants, the discontinuation of the Nkoya chiefs’ state subsidy, and the refusal, on the 
part of the Lozi Paramount Chief, to recognise the new (by local standards perfectly 
regular) incumbents in the thrones of Kahare and Mutondo. But regardless of such outside 
recognition, these chiefs continued to be considered as eminently legitimate by their 
people, and they have functioned as rallying points in the ethnic struggle even more than 
ever before. 
 
 These examples could be multiplied by the thousand, from all over 
twentieth-century Africa. Clearly, the interaction between chiefs and the 
(senior personnel of the) post-colonial state is not about one monolithic scarce 
good; it is not about ‘the overall amount of legitimated power within society’. 
Both categories of actors appear to be in pursuit of a different specific mix of 
scarce goods such as generally recognised in their national society and far 
beyond (e.g. power, prestige, honour, blessing, wealth, security, health, sexual 
gratification, self-esteem), and one side often features as a resource for the 
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other side. Once again, there cannot be a zero-sum game if the players play for 
different (if overlapping) stakes, and play by different and changing (if 
overlapping) rules.  
 Beyond this formal point, it is important to realise that legitimation is 
essentially a quality of being found to be in accordance with a set of rules and 
meanings held collectively by a particular set of people. Which set? I have 
highlighted one such set as consisting of (the functionaries serving at) 
international bodies, but this set is largely irrelevant at the level of chieftaincy; 
hence the news value of the Meru Land Case which we shall discuss below. 
Senior state personnel at the level of the modern national state constitute 
another such set, and although they largely determine legitimation vis-à-vis the 
state, their relevance for local-level legitimation is slight. A Zambian chief who 
has not been gazetted in his country’s Government Gazette cannot claim 
legitimacy from the perspective of the state; hence he cannot enjoy a state 
subsidy, or membership of a representative body such as the House of Chiefs, 
cannot claim government transport at the regional level, etc. But the legitimacy 
he carries in the eyes of his subjects is scarcely if at all effected by his not 
being gazetted. To be precise, in the eyes of his subjects the chief’s legitimacy 
is only negatively effected by state rejection in so far as the state’s conceptual 
framework of legal authority has been internalised by the subjects. The extent 
of such internalisation differs with education, class, profession, urban or rural 
residence and experience, etc. What has been true for a rural backwater like 
western rural Zambia throughout the twentieth century (the idea that a chief’s 
legitimation cannot depend on state recognition), may well have been already 
obsolete among highly urbanised and educated sections of the population of 
Nigeria or Cameroon in the 1950s, as some of the studies in the present book 
suggest.  
 The reverse perspective also applies, and I suspect it to have been 
applicable to much of Africa during much of the twentieth century. A rural 
majority, and a sizeable minority of urban traditionalists, assess the state and its 
personnel from the same perspective of traditional authority as these people 
apply to their own chiefs. The consequence can only be that they deny the state 
all legitimacy.40 For no coherent, time-honoured cosmology underlies the 
state’s procedures, or the selection and performance of its incumbents. Instead, 
these procedures are generally known to be used for self-enrichment and other 
                                                 
40 This is not an imposed, outsider’s etic argument from first principles. I am rendering here, in 
discursive text, the ideas and arguments which I have heard express by hundreds of interlocutors in the 
course of very close association (eventually as Mwene Kahare Kabambi I’s adopted son, under the 
name of Tatashikanda) with royal and traditionalist circles in the chiefly capitals and commoner 
villages of Kaoma district, Zambia, throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Also cf. van Binsbergen 
1986b, 1995, and in press. 
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forms of gratification, and to be invaded by venality. And as a result (at least, 
this is what the traditionalist logic sees as the result), the state does not create 
order but chaos and bloodshed; does not enhance fertility but brings about 
drought, crop failure and AIDS; does not seek or establish purity but borders on 
sorcery; and threatens rather than enforces morality. Viewed from a 
traditionalist chief-centred perspective, the post-colonial state is utterly 
illegitimate, and devoid of cosmological meaning.  
 Realising that this is the perspective of many national citizens, the state can 
do one of two things. It has the long-term option of grooming these people to a 
greater internalisation of legal authority, through education and intensive 
participation in such formal organisations as schools, hospitals, state courts, 
churches, and enterprises. This solution has much to recommend it, notably the 
constitutional history of Western Europe over the past two centuries, when a 
similar itinerary was followed. There is however the risk that Africans, 
enlightened to the letter of legal authority, will object to its free and selfish 
interpretation in the hands the state personnel, and oust them from office.  
 Although introducing elements of hybridity and contradiction which in 
principle upset the modern state’s rationality (but so do clientship, corruption, 
mismanagement, coups, civil war, warlordism, and genocide), the short-term 
solution for the state’s lack of traditional legitimacy is much cheaper, and far 
less risky. It has been increasingly popular among post-colonial African states: 
co-opt the chiefs as sui generis sources of traditional authority, and use them to 
prop up the state’s legitimacy in the eyes of the rural and traditionalist 
population. 
 As a result the chiefs in post-colonial Africa often yield far greater power 
than in fact is assigned to them according to the modern constitution of the 
national state. 
 
In the light of these considerations, Figure 2 appears to be a more adequate 
rendering of state/chiefs relations. Not some unique scarce good conducive to a 
zero-sum game is at stake, but at least two irreducibly different scarce goods, 
one controlled by the state personnel, the other by the chiefs.  
 This model allows for a great variety of outcomes of chiefs/state 
interaction, far more complex than the zero-sum game model. For instance (see 
Figure 2):  
 
• The power domain of the post-colonial state and that of the chiefs 
interpenetrate to a great extent and one reinforces the other41 – it is 
                                                 
41 Examples of this may be found in the present book. For instance in Nolte’s detailed discussion of 
Nigerian chieftaincy it becomes clear that:  
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difficult to say whether the post-colonial state legitimates the chiefs or, 
alternatively, the chiefs legitimate the post-colonial state, but the effect 
is that both thrive and expand; 
• the post-colonial state has all but eclipsed the power sphere of the 
chiefs, and such little power as the chiefs retain is largely 
accommodated to the post-colonial state;42  
• the post-colonial state and the chiefs have each retained a rather distinct 
sphere of power, with little overlap and little mutual accommodation.  
 
 The African chiefs can only add extra legitimation to the state (or, 
reversely, can only expose the shallow legitimation of the state), to the extent to 
which in the eyes of all involved (i.e.the state personnel, the chiefs, the latter’s 
subjects, and the population at large) there is a very close identification 
between the chiefs and their people. Such identification is, for instance, a 
central theme in Perrot & Fauvelle’s splendid recent collection on African 
chieftaincy, Le retour des rois.43 The point of WIM VAN BINSBERGEN’S paper is 
that such identification, although often taken for granted in the literature on 
African chieftaincy, may largely be a recent construct, notably a product of 
                                                                                                                                            
‘traditional authority actively contributes to the negotiation and configuration of local, 
regional and even wider political identities, thus actively shaping Africa’s political landscape 
below and beyond the level of state politics.’ 
and in de Haan’s contribution:  
‘Later, in the first years of French colonial rule, Gourma society underwent further 
transformations. The French clearly realised that, although they did have a much larger 
physical presence in the region than the Germans had ever had, they could only rule with the 
aid of local chiefs. (...) The French thus actively interfered in the nomination of these chiefs 
and local chiefs became pillars in the collection of taxes, the recruitment of forced labourers, 
maintenance of roads, health control, justice and the introduction of cash crops. As a result 
the power of local chiefs increased: backed by the colonial administration they exploited their 
new tasks for their individual and family’s benefit.’ 
Incidentally, the latter passage seems to suggest that the chiefs’ power did not already change radically 
under German rule, to begin with. This is not very convincing, in the first place because any 
superimposition of an over-arching colonial state is a radical infringement on the power of pre-existing 
local rulers; and secondly, because the Germans, in the first decades of European colonial expansion in 
Africa, tended to violently interfere with local social, political and productive matters. For a Tanzanian 
parallel case of early German colonial rule, cf. Huijzendveld 1996. 
42 Cf. Awasom in the present book:  
‘Throughout the twentieth century the fons of Mankon have been entangled in a web of 
nation-statism inaugurated by the colonial presence. As this article has shown, the fons have 
found it extremely difficult to manage their political space. The presence of an all-
encompassing modern state clearly implies the limitation of the fons’ scope of action within 
new politico-legal frameworks.’ 
43 Perrot & Fauvelle 2003.  
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twentieth-century state incorporation. It need not reflect a constant cultural 
feature dating back to pre-colonial times. In line with the twentieth-century 
transformation of African chieftainship which is generally acknowledged 
throughout this volume, he addresses two forms of discontinuity which often 
have gone unrecognised:  
 
• discontinuity (ethnic, linguistic, cultural, ideological, symbolic) between 
chiefs and people, and  
• discontinuity between precolonial, colonial and post-colonial chieftaincy. 
 
 Van Binsbergen demonstrates that the elaborate and seductively beautiful 
culture of royal courts in western central Zambia in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries was based on exploitative and terrifying violence exerted 
by the courts upon the commoner villages, as the radical denial of the self-
regulating, pacifist kinship order of the commoner villages.44 This leaves him 





Figure 2. The relations between chiefs and the post-colonial state conceived as the 
interaction between at least two irreducibly different defined, sui generis forms of 
legitimate power  
A = the post-colonial state (///) and its legitimate power on the basis of legal authority. B = the chiefs 
(\\\) and their legitimate power on the basis of traditional authority. Continuous grey: various other 
sources of economic, media, religious, domestic, parental, etc. power in society. C = the inherently 
heterogeneous, perspectival, kaleidoscopic complex of power in society.  
 
                                                 
44 Cf. van Binsbergen 2001. 
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‘It is very likely that the successive incorporation, more or less at minority status, in the 
wider state systems of the Kololo, Luyana and British, served to blur the cultural and 
structural distinctions between the ‘Nkoya’ court and the local villages, since now the 
court was no longer the exploitative ‘other’ but, to the contrary, the instance from which 
the local population increasingly derived their ethnic name and identity amidst the 
inimical and exploiting wider world. From an exploiting and terrifying stranger, the 
Mwene had become the hallmark of local ethnic identity.’ 
 
 
Structure or agency?  
The contributions discussed so far have sought to present a combination of 
historical narrative and structural explanation. In the latter respect they are 
indebted (directly or distantly) to the tradition of classic mid-twentieth century 
anthropology, associated with the names of Evans-Pritchard and Fortes, and 
with the model of social organisation these authors explored in their 
ethnographies.45 However, that tradition scarcely outlasted the generation that 
produced it. Before the 1950s were over, the major works of the Manchester 
School had been published or at least written (in the form of PhD theses 
awaiting publication). In those works not enduring and anonymous social 
structure was stressed, but the inchoate nature of the social and political 
process. In this innovative perspective, actors were no longer considered to act 
out, blindly and docilely, a script dictated to them by some all-encompassing, 
eminently authoritative ‘social structure’ or ‘society’ (à la Durkheim46). 
Instead, actors were depicted as groping to find their way between the multiple 
and often contradictory opportunities offered to them by power relations, 
formal rules, economic constraints, the accumulated effects of earlier social 
events, and pure chance. The anonymous fiction of ‘society’ gave way to an 
image of the social process as a complex and essentially unpredictable social 
drama, whose protagonists had to be studied in great detail over years, paying 
attention to all the resources that kinship, locality, and political manoeuvring 
offered them; to the historicity of the shifts in these resources; and to their 
manyfold accumulated effects, over time. Agency had, avant la lettre, entered 
the anthropological study of Africa, and of African law. Abandoning the idea 
of a set societal script, also meant that legal rules were relegated to the status of 
manipulable ideological resources, and that the road was open towards a new 
conception of African customary law. Not the rules but the process, both in 
court and outside, came to occupy the centre of scholarly attention. Since rules 
were manipulable, any formalised statement of ideal or practicable norms and 
rules would have to be deconstructed and critiqued just like any other actors’ 
                                                 
45 Evans-Pritchard 1967 (first published 1940); Evans-Pritchard & Fortes 1940; Fortes 1945, 1949. 
46 Durkheim 1912. 
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statements. Instead, the underlying structural regularities, the room for 
manoeuvre as well as the firm constraints, had to be detected by the 
researcher’s own ‘extended analysis’47 of the social process, and particularly of 
such contradictions as come to the fore in conflicts and their settlement.  
 In these developments, which were at the heart of Gluckman’s Manchester 
School,48 Gluckman himself played a somewhat ambivalent role. As supervisor 
and senior colleague, he extended great theoretical and methodological 
inspiration as well as editorial and institutional support towards such authors as 
Clyde Mitchell, Victor Turner and Jaap van Velsen. Yet Gluckman’s own 
ethnographic work, based on fieldwork in South Africa and Zambia in the 
1930s and early 1940s, occasionally fell back upon an earlier, classic position 
and does not always offer the best illustrations of Manchester methods and 
insights.49  
 We shall come back to these issues below when discussing African 
customary law. At this point, let us signal that the shift from structure to 
agency, while unavoidably implied in those contributions to this book that 
present an historical narrative of chiefs’ performance in the colonial and post-
colonial period, is particularly noticeable in the contribution by LEO DE HAAN. 
His paper on changing livelihoods in northern Togo continues a line of work 
implicit in that of van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal: the general anthropological 
description of West African societies within a time perspective. De Haan takes 
exception with a popular contemporary view. He argues that merely linking up 
with globalisation (i.e. getting connected to the global flows of information, 
capital, goods etc.), is not sufficient to make people in developing countries 
more successful in organising a decent livelihood. The logic of the neo-liberal 
consensus holds that poor communities need to be opened up in order to profit 
from globalisation and thus to develop. However, against the background of 
current globalisation studies, de Haan’s paper argues that successful or 
unsuccessful linking up with the world system is not a matter of simply 
opening up, but the result of a delicate articulation of external economic and 
political forces and local livelihoods. Repeatedly, and rather convincingly, de 
Haan invokes the agency of labour migrants and elders in order to explain the 
results detectable through historical analysis.  
 Yet one suspects that there is another side to this coin. It would be 
eminently possible (and in the light of previous work,50 decidedly tempting) to 
rephrase de Haan’s analysis in the structural terms of the articulation of modes 
                                                 
47 Van Velsen 1967.  
48 Cf. Werbner 1984. 
49 Cf. Brown 1979; Gulliver 1978; Kuper 1970; Macmillan 1995; van Binsbergen 1977. 
50 Meillassoux 1975; Gerold-Scheepers & van Binsbergen 1978; van Binsbergen & Geschiere 1985. 
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of production in Northern Togo. He seems to play with the idea himself; 
occasionally he cannot help himself and lapses into using the very word 
‘articulation’. A balanced combination of agency with structure would do 
justice to the complexities and internal contradictions of the situation.  
 Agency is even more of an explicit concern in FRANCIS NYAMNJOH’s 
contribution on chiefs in Cameroon and Botswana. The situation of chiefs in 
twentieth-century Africa would become crystal-clear if we could only discard 
any assumption of enduring patterns of social organisation – patterns marked 
by inertia, in other words by the tendency to perpetuate and reproduce 
themselves, – and instead invoke an unbounded and apparently unstructured 
field of general agency, in which chiefs freely rub shoulders with national 
modern politicians, university graduates, journalists, members of cultural 
associations, etc. Such an approach would reveal the chiefs to be simply one 
category of actors in a vast and well-lit arena. Making the best of their 
resources, such chiefs could truly be said to be among the main forces to 
ensure, in Nyamnjoh’s words, that 
 
‘Africans are simultaneously modernising their traditions and traditionalising their 
modernities’.  
 
 Following this lead we would be in a position to fully appreciate what van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal has treated under the heading of ‘syncretism’: the 
compromise between traditional local values and procedures, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the forms imposed by the state. Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 
has identified such ‘a synthesis between antagonistic forces stemming from 
different state models, bureaucracies and world views’, as an important aspect 
of the transformation of twentieth-century chieftaincy:  
 
‘If we consider chiefs as agents and chieftaincy as dynamic institutions, we are likely to 
be more patient towards ongoing processes of negotiation, accommodation and 
conviviality between continuities and encounters with difference and innovation on the 
continent. We would be less keen on signing a death warrant for or seeking to bury 
chieftaincy alive. Cameroonians and Batswana, like other Africans, have been quick to 
recognise the merits and limitations of liberal democracy and its rhetoric of rights, 
because of their lack of might under global consumer capitalism and because of the sheer 
resilience and creativity of their cultures. With this recognition has come the quest for 
creative ways of marrying tradition and modernity, ethnicity and statehood, subjection 
and citizenship, might and right.’51  
 
 However, while there is considerable truth and persuasion in Nyamnjoh’s 
analysis, one wonders whether such a radical shift of perspective, towards 
agency in an apparently unbounded homogeneous field, is enough to render 
                                                 
51 Nyamnjoh, contribution to the present book.  
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obsolete (to reduce to the status of non-issues) some of the questions that 
(however much Nyamnjoh dismisses North Atlantic Africanist scholarship) 
have occupied the intercontinental study of Africa for decades. On the basis of 
what resources do the chiefs display their agency? Why is it that they appear, 
in their own eyes, in the eyes of their subjects, of the state, and of many others, 
as endowed with an independent power base which cannot be reduced to the 
modern national state? Why are the respect and the fear which chiefs inspire 
throughout Africa, able to survive in the face of state incorporation, even 
though all the basic assumptions of chieftaincy run counter to the modern 
state’s rationalist logic of legal authority: ascription, inequality, cosmology, 
supernatural election and sanctioning, control over land and other natural 
resources, the responsibility to combat witchcraft, the association52 with 
witchcraft at the same time?  
 Only a structural analysis can answer the question as to the power base of 
the chiefs’ agency, in so far as this does not derive from recognition by the 
modern national state but lies in a dextrous display of traditional authority. 
Such an analysis would need to recognise a few home truths:  
 
• The socio-political field where the chiefs’ agency is being exercised, is 
inherently complex, heterogeneous, and wrought with contradictions;53  
• while being in some respects continuous and of world-wide extension, 
that socio-political field is also, in other respects, compartmentalised 
and parochial; and  
• in addition to the state and the forces of globalisation – and in direct 
response to the latter – local forces of identity and self-definition are at 
work; they use tradition not merely as an essentialist escape from reality 
(although, admittedly, any form of ethnic, regional or national 
consciousness tends to essentialism and needs to be analysed as such), 
but as a means to defy the alienating imposition of foreign form, the 
destruction of local meaning, and the denial of historical collective pain 
and humiliation.  
                                                 
52 Cf. van Binsbergen 1987, 2001. 
53 ‘Complex, heterogeneous, and wrought with contradictions’... While agency-centred transactional-
ism, with its implications on unbounded social space, general access, and in general the irrelevance of 
institutionalised social boundaries (assumptions which have come back to us in today’s globalisation 
studies) cannot theoretically accommodate these unmistakable features of chieftaincy and of so many 
other aspects of contemporary African societies, there is at least one elaborate theoretical model which 
can: that of the articulation of modes of production. Cf. van Binsbergen & Geschiere 1985b (which 
contains an extensive interpretation of a Zambian chief’s court from this theoretical perspective); van 
Binsbergen 1981b, 1992; and for the persisting theoretical merits of this approach: van Binsbergen 
1998. It is for this theoretical reason, and not for any nostalgia vis-à-vis Marxism as such, that this 
approach returns in this Introduction, and also informs van Binsbergen’s chapter in the present book.  
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We need to explicitly acknowledge the contradiction between two empirical 
givens: 
 
• The state on the one hand, the chiefs (and the rural society they stand 
for) on the other, are caused to be in constant interaction with each other 
(which makes for merging and blurring of boundaries in actual political 
and economic practice, and creates the suggestion of a continuous field 
of interaction merely inviting strategies of agency, à la Nyamnjoh),  
• yet at a level of the explicit conceptualisations, by the actors involved, 
the constant movement back and forth between what they construct to 
be a distinct traditional domain as against a distinct modern domain, 
warrants the view that two fundamentally different modes of socio-
political organisation are involved here.  
 
 Table 1 presents the etic outline of an actors’ model which, from the point 
of view of many traditionalist African actors, would seem to sum up the 
structural differences between chiefs and the post-colonial state : 
 
 
post-colonial state chief 





imported within living memory considered as local 
culturally alien considered as culturally familiar, self- evident 
defective legitimation self-evident legitimation 
lack of cosmological anchorage cosmological anchorage 
 
Table 1. A model contrasting chiefs and post-colonial state from the viewpoint 
of traditionalist African actors today. 
 
This model allows us to make an important point. At least in the traditionalists’ 
own perception, any interaction between post-colonial states and chiefs 
involves bridging two fundamentally different structures. Ethnicisation, the 
elaboration of ethnic identity through invented traditions and formal self-
organisation, is a familiar idiom in which such bridging takes place. But why 
should it be able to do the trick? The answer becomes clear once we have 
defined more closely what such bridging consists of. It amounts to the 
negotiation of aporetic conceptual boundaries (i.e. boundaries that are 
essentially non-negotiable in terms of the formal premises at play). Such 
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paradoxical negotiation takes place through concrete interaction. In this 
operation, objects and people are positioned at the conceptual boundaries 
between two systems, where they can serve as interfaces between the two. In 
the dialectics of social praxis, conceptually different domains are drawn, first, 
within such contradictory perceptions, motivations and exchanges as each 
single actor is capable of; and secondly, these contradictions are to be made 
convergent, predictable, and persistent over time by their being imbedded in 
the social organisation of these individual actors.  
 In other words, structural bridging inevitably requires, beyond 
conceptualisation, effective social organisation. The structure of the extended 
field within which the chiefs’ agency is realised, is in the first place the social 
organisation of modern life in terms of formal organisations. These include the 
formal organisation of the state, but also the formal organisation of the chief’s 
capital, of ethnic and cultural associations, of non-governmental organisations 
such as churches and development agencies whose actors interact both with the 
state and the chiefs. The modern formal organisation corresponds morpholog-
ically with the organisational logic of the state; at the same time, in the fields of 
ideology, symbolism, and personnel, it can maintain as much continuity as is 
needed towards structural domains that are conceived in terms of a logic totally 
different from that of the state (such as chieftaincy). Therefore the mode of 
mobilisation which structurally bridges state and chiefs had to take the form of 
a formal voluntary association. 
 Another example, taken from contemporary North Atlantic society, may 
further drive home the implications of this theoretical explanation. Even under 
conditions of high levels of commodification of public life, where a capitalist 
logic has penetrated many spheres of experience such as recreational 
behaviour, sexual behaviour, care for the sick and the dead, yet most people 
have insisted on perpetuating (in fact, in actively reconstructing and protecting) 
domains of personal and collective self-realisation where conscious measures 
are taken so that the capitalist logic of commodification, however all-pervasive, 
cannot dominate there. Love, friendship, the nuclear and extended family, 
healing, prayer, scholarship, come to mind as likely examples. The amazing 
thing is even that the entire demographic reproduction of the public sphere (in 
other words, the production of its human personnel) has always taken place in 
such secluded domains of intimacy. At this level of abstraction, we need not be 
surprised any more about the survival of African chieftaincy in the face of the 
logic of the state: in the North Atlantic region, the survival, not only of 
obsolescent remnants of aristocracy, but of such a massive and vital 
phenomenon as the nuclear family, is essentially in the same analytical bracket. 
While the nuclear family is (as yet) indispensable for demographic 
reproduction, it interfaces with the state and the public sphere through formal 
Introduction: Chiefs and the state, agency, customary law, and violence 
39 
organisations such as schools, hospitals, churches, recreational associations, 
commercial enterprises and enterprises offering paid or voluntary employment. 
These formal organisations, on the one hand, emulate the organisational logic 
of the state and capitalism, on the other hand, in terms of contents, personnel 
recruitment, and their underlying ideology, can be finely tuned to the (always 
changing) cultural values implied in family life.  
 So far, in a nutshell, a possible structural analysis serving to complement an 
analyis of contemporary African chieftaincy in terms of agency. However, even 
a structural analysis would need to be brought to life by the application of such 
lessons concerning agency as Nyamnjoh’s contribution contains. 
 
Much of the early work of van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal was concerned with the 
exploration of processes of adjudication in chiefs’ courts in northern Togo. 
This led him on the one hand to extensive and seminal studies of chieftaincy, 
on the other hand to reflection on the nature of law in Africa. It is to the latter 
topic that we now turn.  
 
 
The nature of customary law 
BARBARA OOMEN’s paper deals with local laws that concern the power and 
authority of traditional leaders in Sekhukhune, in northern South Africa, and 
their dynamic relationship with official ‘state law’. In addition to the topics 
discussed above, Oomen thus addresses another leading themes in van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s oeuvre: the interaction between formal, codified 
state law and local living norms. Taking her cue from his ideas on ‘syncretism’, 
the paper assesses how local, customary legislation exists in relation with 
official state legislation. It does this by examining legislation that determines 
the position of traditional leaders in post-apartheid South Africa, in the area of 
Sekhukhune. It is argued that local, customary law is continuously negotiated. 
In a subtle manner she describes the complex legal scene at Sekhukhune. She 
provides apt, original and convincing illustrations of some of the most 
fundamental insights which have been gained in the field of African customary 
law over the past few decades, including the processual nature of local law, and 
the dependence of legal resources on general community resources. She 
manages to take some of these insights considerably further. As a window on 
how, at the local and regional level, law is shaped by the recent (post-
apartheid) transformation of South Africa, and how law in its turn helps to 
shape that transformation, the article is very illuminating. It introduces a 
number of useful distinctions that may well find their way into the wider 
literature.  
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 Oomen notes the obsolete rigidity with which the South African state and 
its Government Anthropologists (apparently even years after the attainment of 
majority rule) have, almost fetichistically, clung to the conception of customary 
law as the straightforward application of rules (rules which, moreover, are 
supposed to be highly specific and distinctive for a particular ethnic group as 
once defined under the apartheid state):  
 
‘In practice, the department’s anthropologists check the candidates against the files of 
genealogies they possess – which are already computerised at national level – and against 
the relevant anthropological handbooks and customary law textbooks. If the candidate put 
forward does not comply with the requirements of the official customary law contained in 
these texts, a candidacy will generally be refused.’  
 
 In this light, a new application is found for the insight54 that succession, in 
the context of South Central and Southern African chieftaincy, amounts to the 
selection, from among a pool of eligible candidates, of the candidate who is 
most suitable in terms of such contemporary concerns as personal achievement 
(education, experience, character etc.), while the outcome is yet pretended to be 
ascriptive and rule-driven. One wonders, however, whether this is really such a 
timeless general principle as Oomen suggests:  
 
‘The Sekhukhune succession disputes demonstrate how people try to couple ascription 
and achievement and pursue good governance by first selecting – from among a limited 
pool of candidates – the best candidate, and subsequently legitimising his claim in terms 
of customary law.’  
 
For, given the South African state’s fixation on succession rules, and its control 
over the recognition of chiefs, an alternative interpretation of the evidence 
might be the following. South African chiefs and their electors have no choice 
but to stress, before the state, that chiefly election, once made, was entirely 
determined by the traditional ascriptive rules. However, in other contexts when 
the state officials are not breathing down their necks, the electors might be 
prepared to consciously admit that an element of achievement and agency does 
play an important role. Would not the insistence on ascription be partly a 
product of the recent history of South Africa, notably its heritage of a 
particularly vicious, paternalistic and racialist state? In that case one would 
expect that the emphasis on ascription as the ultimate factor in succession is not 
laid to the same extent as in South Africa in other parts of the rather continuous 
cultural region of Southern and South Central Africa. It is my impression that 
such an expectation is borne out by the ethnographic evidence.  
 
                                                 
54 Cf. Gluckman 1963; Goody 1966; Holy 1986; Parson 1990; van Binsbergen 1992.  
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If legal syncretism includes the borrowing of cosmopolitan or colonial forms in 
order to revive and contest local institutional contents, than another example of 
this phenomenon is presented in CATHÉRINE BAROIN’s paper. She describes 
how, on the southeastern slopes of Mt. Meru in Northern Tanzania, a small 
tribe of Bantu-speaking farmers, the Rwa (or Meru), became famous in 1952 
for challenging the British in a legal case brought to the UNO in New York, the 
Meru Land Case. One outcome of this struggle was that the Rwa created an 
apparently brand-new ‘traditional’ form of chieftaincy of their own, in order to 
thwart the official colonial power operating through established but disputed 
local chiefs. From the start, this new form of chieftaincy was associated with a 
‘constitution’, following an idea first suggested by the British, as they 
endeavoured to set up ‘local governments’ for each ‘tribe’ they were ruling in 
Tanzania. Baroin outlines the history of both this new format of chieftaincy and 
its written constitution, which still operate to this day and play a significant part 
in local public life.  
 In a context where the common African custom of deferment of 
bridewealth payment raises puzzled comment, one does not expect a strong 
historical awareness of pre-colonial local forms of authority. As a result, the 
alternative form of Rwa chieftaincy is depicted as a contemporary innovation 
which came entirely out of the blue. Also the British-inspired, formal 
constitutional format by which this institution is underpinned, suggests a 
thoroughly recent thing. Yet I believe that underneath these contemporary 
trappings a long-term historical process can be detected that has occurred 
widely in Africa. It consists in the tension between two forms of socio-political 
organisation which in many parts of Africa appeared in succession in the 
process of pre-colonial state formation: 
 
1. Pacifist reconciliation and sanctuary based on a ritual relation with the earth 
– in the symbolic elaboration of this legal-political institution (usually at the 
sub-national, clan level) androgynous themes may be observed, as well as 
oath-taking, and leopard(-skin) symbolism;55 as against,  
2. A violence-based, tributary legal order in the hands of rulers – in the 
symbolic elaboration of this legal political institution (usually situated at the 
                                                 
55 The specific ethnographic cases include North African saints (Gellner 1969); the Nuer leopard-skin 
chief (Evans-Pritchard 1967); and Zambian rain shrines (Colson 1960; van Binsbergen 1981b). My 
projection of the Zambian Nkoya case (see my contribution to the present book) onto the Rwa situation 
is not without grounds. The Nkoya show continuities with northeastern Tanzanian political institutions, 
e.g. an early Nkoya ruler Likambi was known as ‘the Mangi’ (a term meaningless in the contemporary 
Nkoya context but the generic term for ruler among the Rwa), while the kazanga royal harvest festival 
is also reported under the same name from northeastern Tanzania (van Binsbergen 1992; Huijzendveld 
1996). Under this extended royal complex I suspect South Asian influences, which are also hinted at by 
the name Mt. Meru itself – identical to the world mountain of South Asian mythology.  
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national level, above individual clans) masculine themes are emphasised, as 
well as formal court proceedings, and lion symbolism.56  
 
 Considered in this light, the legal syncretism of the Rwa case as described 
by Baroin appears to have a further dimension in that the modern constitutional 
form revives a mode of pacifist reconciliation that has existed on Tanzanian 
soil for hundreds if not thousands of years, until it was eclipsed by pre-colonial 
rulers or colonial chiefs of a more articulate royal type.  
 The Rwa apparently realised that, if they were to supplant the existing form 
of colonial-backed chieftaincy by another chiefly institution of their own 
preference, they would need the best possible outside patronage they could get: 
the state itself. I suggest that it may have been this agency-driven strategy, as 
much as what Baroin invokes as ‘the strength of the national feeling in 
Tanzania, which is a prevailing attitude throughout the country’, which 
explains the wonderful phenomenon of an older form of informal clan 
chieftaincy being revived through a modern constitutional format.  
 
Not legal syncretism, but the very nature of disputes and dispute processes – 
which has always been at the core of legal anthropology – is the topic of 
KEEBET VON BENDA-BECKMANN’s contribution to the present book. Over time, 
legal anthropologists have advanced different reasons as to why disputes 
should be important to them. The work of van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal is 
argued to reflect these shifts: starting out with his doctoral dissertation on 
marriage and inheritance disputes in northern Togo, his work, especially that 
on chieftaincy in West Africa, has reflected the more general move, away from 
an interest in institutions of dispute management, and towards the wider 
political contexts in which the validity of various normative orders are 
reconstituted, contested, and merged.57 Against this background, Keebet von 
Benda-Beckmann traces the general development in the study of dispute 
behaviour in legal anthropology. She reminds us how in the more recent 
literature, courts of law are no longer primarily considered as institutions of 
conflict settlement:  
 
‘Rather than continuing to accept that people carry out disputes because they simply wish 
to settle them, it became clear that people have a variety of reasons for taking their 
particular dispute to a particular institution. It was pointed out that some people have for 
instance political motivations for going to court; others may have more personal reasons; 
and yet others simply wish to have their day in court and be publicly heard, whatever the 
outcome of the trial; and some, indeed, wish to settle their dispute. On the whole it was no 
                                                 
56 Cf. van Binsbergen 1981b, 1992, in press, and contribution to the present book. 
57 Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1987, 1996, 1998; Ray & van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996a. 
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longer taken for granted that the role of courts and court-like institutions was dispute 
settlement.’  
 
In particular, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann highlights the increasing emphasis 
on the environments (social, political, legal) in which disputes evolve:  
 
‘Over time the environments in which disputes are carried out have been increasingly 
recognised to be important for the understanding of disputing behaviour. Over the past 
thirty years the analysis of disputes has become increasingly sophisticated. These 
environments have a temporal and a local perspective. They also have normative and 
cognitive aspects. The contexts in which people operate in disputes and outside them, are 
made up of persons, who explicitly or implicitly argue and operate in different idioms 
referring to normative or legal orders that often are highly fragmented. The combinations 
in these plural settings are often contested and are not always fully understood by the 
participants of disputes themselves.’58 
 
 Assuming a growth of sophistication, our author implies an optimistic, 
Popperian view of the steady and unilineal accumulation of scientific insight. 
Such a view has not exactly gone uncontested in recent decades.59 Keebet von 
Benda-Beckmann seems to suggest that the phenomena under study (disputes 
in African court contexts) have remained fairly constant, while as a result of 
much scholarly scrutiny and reflection the true nature of these phenomena was 
more and more revealed to legal anthropologists. However, legal 
anthropologists are actors on the local, regional, national and international 
scene in Africa, just like the people they study in and out of court. The disputes 
on which legal anthropologists focus, focus less, or no longer focus, are set 
within a continuously changing and widening African socio-political context 
whose structure has undergone tremendous changes. In the course of the 
twentieth century it has become trapped more and more in the clutches of 
globalisation, with the concomitant decline of African national states and 
economies.  
 I submit that it is not only the legal anthropologists who have changed their 
mind, but that also the very disputes they have studied have undergone 
fundamental changes over the decades. Did the earlier legal anthropologists 
have it all wrong, or did the colonial chiefs’ courts really revolve around 
conflict settlement to a markedly greater extent than they do today? Did the 
earlier legal anthropologists simply overlook forum shopping and the wider 
social process (in Keebet von Benda-Beckmann’s terms, ‘the environment of 
disputes’) in which any particular court case would be embedded? Or was the 
relative autonomy of the court vis-à-vis its local social environment more of an 
empirical fact in colonial times (when conceptions of power and justice were 
                                                 
58 Italics added, WvB. 
59 Foucault 1969, 1970, 1980; Kuhn 1962; Lakatos & Musgrave 1970; Popper 1959. 
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little negotiable, backed up as they were by the colonial conquest state), than it 
can ever be today, with the decline of the post-colonial state, the people’s 
greater internalisation of legal authority, the onslaught of globalisation, the 
effective expansion of a cash economy geared to globally circulating 
manufactured products, and the increasing deepening of ethnic and regional 
conflict, in the final quarter of the twentieth century?  
 
The final contribution on legal anthropology is by FRANZ VON BENDA-
BECKMANN. He returns to a theme that has dominated the Dutch ‘Folk Law 
Circle’ for decades and that has also played an important role in van Rouveroy 
van Nieuwaal’s work: legal pluralism. Franz von Benda-Beckmann’s paper is 
ethnographically rooted in Indonesia, but it takes a comparative view, and 
addresses a problematic that has great relevance for van Rouveroy van 
Nieuwaal’s fieldwork area in northern Togo, and indeed for Africa as a whole. 
The paper looks at the role of Islamic law, and seeks to define the lessons that 
the study of legal pluralism could draw from the case of Islamic law. Religious 
law, and Islamic law in particular, has largely been neglected in discussions of 
legal pluralism. In Indonesia, for instance, most attention has been given to the 
discrepancies and struggles between, on the one hand, the local, regional and/or 
ethnic laws (usually called adat or ‘adat laws’), and, on the other hand, the law 
of the colonial Netherlands East Indies, and of the post-colonial state of 
Indonesia. That country provides interesting counterpoints to the history of 
Islamic law in African and Arab countries, and indicates additional variations 
of plural legal constellations within one state. Franz von Benda-Beckmann’s 
paper is based on etnographic research conducted in two very different regions 
of Indonesia: Minangkabau in West Sumatra, and the Island of Ambon, in the 
Central Moluccas, Eastern Indonesia. In these two areas, Islam and Islamic law 
have different meanings in the daily life of villagers. At a general level of 
social organisation, the relationships between state law, adat, Islamic law, and 
on Ambon also Christian law, are quite different. In fact, they are counter-
intuitive. For despite the strong cultural basis rooted in the common adat of 
both Islamic and Christian villages on Ambon, the relations between adat and 
the religious life differ considerably. The relation between adat and Islam in 
Minangkabau turns out to be quite different from that on Ambon, and in fact 
much more resembles the relation between adat and Christianity as found in 
the latter context.  
 From his analysis, Franz von Benda-Beckmann extracts five points that are 
of considerable relevance for the study of Islamic law in African contexts of 
legal pluralism, and that are likely to find their way into the wider comparative 
literature on the subject:  
 
Introduction: Chiefs and the state, agency, customary law, and violence 
45 
• ‘First, in many regions of the world, Islamic law was present, and had to find an 
accommodation with pre-Islamic and non-Islamic laws, before the introduction of a 
state and state law of the European, colonial type. Legal pluralism usually antedates 
the establishment of a modern state. (...)  
• Secondly, Islamic law has its own ideology of legal centralism. (...) It should 
therefore be taken into account that in plural legal conditions there can be a plurality 
of legal constructions that demarcate the respective spheres of validity of legal 
systems. (...) 
• Thirdly, Islamic law appears to be a wide umbrella encompassing quite different 
constructions of what Islamic law is.’  
• Fourthly, Franz von Benda-Beckmann points to a factor which we have already 
encountered repeatedly above under the heading of ‘syncretism’: ‘to some extent, 
local traditional ideas about family relations, inheritance or contracts could be 
incorporated into Islamic law by creating new legal forms or fictions that gave 
Islamic legal validity to originally non-Islamic forms of contract. (...)  
• Fifthly, Islamic law is transnational law. Hybridisation, creolisation and 
glocalisations of transnational law have been frequent phenomena throughout the 
legal histories of those societies and states in which Islamic law was present.’  
 
With these contributions to legal anthropology in the narrower sense, the 
persistent core of van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s work has been addressed 
interestingly and constructively. Let us now turn to a topic which is rather an 
implied aspect of disputes and chieftaincy in Africa: violence.  
 
 
The role of violence 
Violence sets the background for PETER SKALNIK’s evaluation of the 
coexistence of the two ethnic groups, the Nanumba and the Konkomba, which 
have been co-residing in the territory of the Nanumba district, northern Ghana, 
for more than fifty years. Most of this time the coexistence was peaceful 
though tense, some years however were marked by armed conflicts (1981, 
1994, 1995). In particular, the role of the British colonial and various Ghanaian 
governments vis-à-vis the relationship between the Nanumba and the 
Konkomba is analysed, as the quality of the coexistence turns out to have 
depended, at any one time, on the particular political regime at the national 
level.  
 Violence also turns out to be the limiting factor of the Tanzanian case 
described by Baroin, although a further analysis had to remain outside the 
scope of her contribution to the present book:  
 
‘However, tribal unity was greatly jeopardised in the early 1990s by a violent conflict that 
erupted among the Rwa over the control of the Lutheran diocese on Mt. Meru. (...) A 
lingering dispute followed between the authorities of the official Lutheran church on the 
one hand, and the ‘rebels’ who started a new independent church on the other hand. It 
resulted in so much social disruption that development projects could no longer be 
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implemented, and the proper working of the Rwa’s political institutions was greatly 
hindered.’ 
 
 Violence (particularly such violence as surrounds the male kings who 
supplanted earlier queens and clan leaders) is the central issue in Wim van 
Binsbergen’s approach to state formation in western central Zambia from the 
seventeenth century CE onwards. Violence could play this role since it 
amounted to pursuing, at the royal courts, cultural norms and practices that 
constituted the most radical departure from the norms and practices governing 
life in the commoner villages. The many villages surrounded the few courts, 
and fed the latter with tribute, including food, and with much of its personnel, 
including slaves. The purpose of Wim van Binsbergen’s paper is to present this 
reading of the Nkoya pre-colonial past, and to begin to explore the extent to 
which violence can be said to underlie any form of state formation in pre-
colonial Africa. A vignette derived from a nineteenth-century travelogue 
(according to which the Lozi king Sipopa fed an innocent old man to the 
crocodiles) helps to focus on the main issues, but is only meant as an 
illustration. Although the juxtaposition between village life and court life is 
argued in detail, the substantial oral-historical, documentary and legendary data 
underlying the argument have been presented elsewhere. 
 Also our final contribution, by TRUTZ VON TROTHA, focuses on violence, 
and it does so in ways that are original, unexpected in a book celebrating the 
work of an Africanist, and potentially of world-wide relevance. Von Trotha’s 
argument seeks to interpret no less than the world-wide evolution of large-scale 
violence from the end of World War II to the anonymous attack on the USA on 
11 September 2001. The article fits in our collection for two reasons: it offers a 
theory of war as a specific form of violence, and it does so on the basis of 
inspiration deriving from legal anthropology, notably the work of Spittler.60 
The point von Trotha makes is that, in future, war will be shaped by ‘wars of 
defeat’, by some sort of trading-off between the thermonuclear war of 
extermination and the global small war. Spittler’s theory argues that every 
society has a variety of forms of dispute settlement. These forms are 
institutionalised and legitimised to different degrees, from the private 
discussion within the four walls of one’s house, to blood feuds, and appeals to 
official legal authorities. The forms of dispute settlement are connected with 
each other in a number of ways, of which two are of interest here: 
 
• Every form of dispute settlement is influenced by its alternatives;  
• this interdependence of the forms of dispute settlement is 
characterised by the supremacy of legitimate violence. In stateless 
                                                 
60 Cf. Spittler 1980. 
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societies it is violent self-help that throws this shadow; in state 
societies it is the institutions of the state monopoly on violence, in 
the first instance the police and the army.  
 
 What is held to be true for domestic dispute settlement may also be true for 
armed conflicts, at least since the use of the atomic bomb against Japan in 
World War II: forms of war are interdependent. Any war belongs to an order of 
wars, in which each form of war is influenced by existing alternative forms. In 
terms of space, today these alternatives can cover the whole world. The 
supreme form in this order of wars is determined by which agent has the 
greatest destructive potential both militarily and in terms of its technology of 
arms. Today this is the thermonuclear war of extermination. Hence the 
common retreat into the forms of small war and the global small war, 
phenomena with which most citizens of the world have become acquainted 
over the past decades, either by electronic means of by personal experience. 
 If legal anthropology can help us understand the most threatening and 
destructive events of our era, that would be the highest praise for this sub-





This book celebrates a scholar whose complex and often difficult career has 
greatly helped us to focus on crucial issues in African Studies and in legal 
anthropology which, to judge by the contributions in this book, will continue to 
inspire us for decades to come. It is my hope and conviction that, even after 
institutional retirement, Emile Adriaan B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal will 
continue to contribute to the investigation of these topics, and (as we have 
moved, during our lifetime, from the book to the furtive, virtual screen image 
as the standard of knowledge transmission) that he will continue to feed our 
eyes and our hearts with his films. The African Studies Centre salutes him as a 
long-standing, productive and constructive colleague.  
 Finally, it is my pleasure to thank all those who have contributed to the 
genesis of this book: the contributors, whose papers show the richness and 
continued relevance of Emile van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal’s work, and whose 
forbearance with my extensive and critical introduction will be a further sign of 
their eminence and wisdom; Riekje Pelgrim, who did part of the editing; the 
African Studies Centre, whose subsidy made the book a viable publishing 
undertaking; Emile van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, who shared his bibliography 
and unknowingly inspired the book throughout; and LIT Verlag, as reliable and 
supportive publishers.  
